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ABSTRACT 
The analysis presented in this paper seeks t o  outline some of the political conse- 
quences of a general decline in the place of the church and religious faith in 
peoples' daily lives in  the Netherlands. I t  juxtaposes a reconstruction of religious 
origins or backgrounds against current assessment of the strength of confessional 
attachments. Erosion of traditional ties t o  the church of one's early loyalties is 
depicted as accompanied by withdrawal from formal participation in the electoral 
process. Interest in politics and informal participation remain high, but the rejec- 
tion of institutionalized religion is associated with what appears t o  be an active 
rejection of institutionalized politics. For  those who d o  remain in the active elec- 
torate, a continued decline in confessional attachment appears t o  forecast a con- 
tinued decline in  confessional party vote. 
Insofar as change in the future involves general depillarization, or  decreased 
political relevance of the church for  all degrees of confessional attachment, the 
political beneficiaries may be the parties of center and right as well as left. An 
across-the-board drop in level of confessional voting would mean that many voters 
with strong confessional attachments would be turning t o  the secular parties and in 
doing so - if the  recent past is any guide - would turn n o  more often t o  the left 
than t o  the other options open to them, However, insofar as the future brings a 
decline in confessional attachment without a diminution in the relevance of confes- 
* This article is based on two national sample surveys, conducted in 1970 and 1972 
as part of a program of political research carried out  in a partnership of the Katho- 
lieke Hogeschool, Tilburg, and Leiden University, The Netherlands, and the Univer- 
sity of Michigan, U.S.A. Support was given by all three institutions, The Nether- 
lands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.) the Ford Foun- 
dation and the National Science Foundation through their grant GS-3640 1 .  In 
addition to  the authors of this article, Professors Hans Daalder, Leiden University, 
and M. Kent Jennings and Jerrold Rusk of the University of Michigan made major 
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sional attachment for confessional voters, the parties of the left will benefit dis- 
proportionately as the newly deconfessionalized turn away from the parties of 
tradition and seek out the parties of change. 
The pervasiveness of on-going change in the religious communities of 
the Netherlands provides an opportunity to examine how changes in 
one set of institutions lead to changes in another. The discussion that 
follows is motivated by a primary interest in the political consequences 
of the decreasing strength of the religious pillars on which so much of 
Dutch society has rested. 
The intersection of social cleavages and political alignments provides 
an important focus for the analysis of political behavior. It is of particu- 
lar interest in the Netherlands because both the society and its politics 
are in transition. The country is moving away from a set of arrange- 
ments that had been traditionally based on an unusually close congru- 
ence between major social cleavages and political alignments. Indeed, 
the particular manner in which a small national community reconciled 
social segmentation based on sharp differences of class and religious 
outlook with the spirit and machinery of democratic government has 
commanded the attention of many observers and scholars. In recent 
years, however, it has become apparent that the old formulae of accom- 
modation that created a consociational polity have been placed under 
heavy strain by the many changes taking place in the country. The 
well-publicized upheavals within the Catholic Church, the increased 
fragmentation of the party system and the many manifestations of 
broadened commitment to new forms of social and political participa- 
tion are among the more notable indicators of such changes. Although 
the Netherlands has seldom been portrayed as a “typical” western (or 
even typical European) polity, the traditional alignments of Dutch so- 
cial and political cleavages have been characteristic of many continental 
European countries. And although social change in Dutch society may 
have its national peculiarities, the ferment that is associated with politi- 
cal change in The Netherlands does not seem to be totally atypical of 
change elsewhere. Even without overt attention to comparisons and 
similarities with other countries, it is hoped that a part of the usefulness 
of this discussion will be found in the more or less ubiquitous nature of 
the phenomena being discussed. 
The Measurement of Confessional Attachment and Deconfessionalization 
Our inquiry begins with an assessment of current attachment or com- 
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TABLE I 
1970 Distribution of Confessional Attachment, Total Population 
Have a religious preference, and 
Always attend church* 
Usually attend church 
Sometimes attend church 
Seldom attend church 
Have a religious preference but 
Never attend church 
Have no religious preference 
% 
29 
13 
11 
8 
11 
28 
100 
Number of Respondents (1821)** 
* The literal translation of the questions asked is: “Do you think you belong to a certain 
religion or denomination?” (If yes) “How often do you attend their services or meetings?” 
** Confessional attachment was not ascertained for 13 respondents. 
mitment to  the major religious institutions of Dutch society. Our data 
resources provide an essentially behavioral indicator, frequency of 
church attendance. Information on religious preference, or identity, 
and church attendance make possible the following assessment of con- 
fessional attachment among Dutch adults in the spring of 1970. 
This current description of confessional attachment has points both 
of similarity and of contrast with earlier times. On the one hand, if 
somewhat more than half of the adults represent themselves as more or 
less faithful religious participants today, almost 50% of the adults in 
The Netherlands (although not the same 50%) come from homogeneous 
religious backgrounds where both parents were of the same religion and 
where they themselves attended a confessional school of that religion. 
At the other extreme, persons who have no current religious preference 
or identity and whose parents were nonreligious constitute only about 
7% of the total population, whereas more than a quarter of the current 
population professes no religion today. Those who are in the second 
generation without a stated religious preference are not only quite dis- 
tinctive in their own right but they are also useful as a base for sub- 
sequent comparison with the much larger group who apparently have 
rejected their religious heritage despite a homogeneous background in 
one faith or the other. 
Ideally, we would like to be able to depict the various shifts that 
have led to the current set of attachments. With data that would indi- 
cate both when and in what ways change had occurred, we could identi- 
fy periods when, for example, strong attachments were weakened or 
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weak attachments replaced with conversion or with a rejection of reli- 
gion. Our information sources do not permit such a detailed reconstruc- 
tion. Instead, we have, and then by inference, information on confes- 
sional attachment at only one earlier point in time, the period of puta- 
tive religious socialization. For each person we have four pieces of 
information with which to reconstruct his or her religious background: 
1) report of mother’s religion, 2 j report of father’s religion, 3) report of 
own attendance at a confessional rather than a public school, and 4) 
identification of the religious affiliation of such a confessional schobl. 
With this information, and the current statement of confessional attach- 
ment, it is possible to fashion an approximate description of the extent 
of “deconfessionalization” in the current population by contrasting the 
current assessment of confessional attachment with the reconstruction 
of the earlier point in time. 
Our interest in deconfessionalization, and in clarifying the meaning 
of current statements of confessional attachment, dictated a particular 
use of our information about the current population of adults and their 
parents. Rather than try to work with all of the complexities which 
even the few pieces of available information could generate, we turned 
to a set of simplifying decisions that would produce four major groups 
for analytic comparison. First, in addition to the group of second gener- 
ation nonreligious, other groups with homogeneous religious back- 
grounds were defined as constituted when 1) both parents were of the 
same religion OY when 2 j a person had attended a confessional school of 
the faith held by at least one parent.2 
From each religious group so defined, we then deleted all cases in 
which a person’s current religious preference was other than the religion 
into which he or she was presumably socialized. All converts, from one 
religion to another or from a nonreligious background to some confes- 
sional attachment, are therefore excluded from our analysis. However, 
persons from a homogeneous religious background but with no current 
religious preference are retained within their respective grouping. Final- 
ly, all minor religions (represented by unreliably small numbers of cases 
on our data base) were set aside. These decisions produced four group- 
ings for subsequent analysis: 1) a homogeneous Catholic group making 
up 40% of the total population, 2) a homogeneous Dutch Reformed 
group constituting 26% of the total, 3) a homogeneous Calvinist group 
made up of 9% of all adults, and 4) the nonreligious group composed of 
7% of the adult population. 
Some 18% of the adults in the Netherlands are excluded from our 
analysis. In some instances the exclusion occurs despite a potential 
interest in such phenomena as religious conversion (perhaps 4% of the 
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total) or the consequences of mixed marriage (2% report one Catholic 
parent and one Protestant). The bulk of the 1870, however, is made up 
from a variety of cases in which it is not possible to establish that a 
person’s current stance toward religion represents a departure from 
childhood experience in home and school and is therefore a possible 
indication of deconfessionalization. The footnote in Table TI describes 
these cases in somewhat greater detail. 
Using our definition of homogeneity in religious background, a 
rather global description of the current state of change in confessional 
attachment in Dutch society is presented in Table 11. That table pre- 
TABLE I1 
Confessional Attachments in Dutch Society in 1970, for Major Groups with Homogeneous 
Religious Background 
~ 
Religious Background 
Dutch Non- 
Current Attachment (K) (DR) (C) (NR) Other Cases Percent 
Catholic Reformed Calvinist Religious Total 
Attend Church 31 14 7 0 - (966) 53* 
(576)** (255) (135) 
Identify with religion 
of origin but do not 
attend church 3 5 * 0 - (158) 9* 
(63) (90) (5 1 
Have no religious 
preference 5 7 1 7 - (372) 20 
Other - 
(96) (120) (24) (132) 
- - - 18 (338) 18 
40%* 26% 9%* 7% t 18%*** 100 
Number of Respon- 
dents (735) (465) (164) (132) (338) 1834 
* Entries of these columns and rows do not add to column and row totals because of frao 
Gons less than 0.5 being distributed among two or more categories. 
*** Includes 136 cases (7% of total) where the respondent has no current religious preference 
but respondent’s religious origin was in some religion other than K, DR and C, where the reli- 
gious origin is mixed, or where the religious origin is unclear; 68 cases (4% of total) where res- 
pondent’s origins are clearly K, DR or C and where the respondent has converted to another 
religion; and 134 cases (7% of total) where the religion is a minor religion in the Netherlands 
(Jews, Lutherans, Remonstrants, etc.), where the religion of origin is unclear (mixed marriages 
and no church school attendance) or where missing data for parents or respondent makes classi- 
fication impossible. 
** Figures in parentheses indicate number of cases. 
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sents the current expressions of confessional attachment within each of 
the four groups with homogeneous religious backgrounds. A close com- 
parison with Table I leads to the correct inference that the incidence of 
religious preference or church attendance among the 18% in the residu- 
al “other” category is lower than for the major segments of the popula- 
tion that will concern us in the remainder of this discussion. Conse- 
quently, insofar as those in the residual group with little or no confes- 
sional attachment are like the “deconfessionalized” in our major 
groups, the impact of the absence of confessiona1 attachment on Dutch 
politics may be understated in our subsequent analysis. 
Comparisons across the three religious groupings (among the four) 
are facilitated by a more detailed inspection of contemporary church 
attendance. As demonstrated in Table 111, a contrast between Dutch 
Reformed and Calvinist is immediately apparent, with the latter show- 
ing a remarkable degree of behavioral adherence to family traditions 
and, therefore, limited evidence of probable deconfessionalization. Five 
out of every six persons (83%) of Calvinistic background report attend- 
ing church at least occasionally, while nearly half (45%) of the Dutch 
Reformed group reports either nonattendance or the absence of any 
religious preference at all. However, the very extremity of this contrast 
provides an occasion to warn against the assumption that we are neces- 
sarily observing only the consequences of deconfessionalization. There 
is every reason to expect that some part of the difference between the 
two Protestant groups is one of the persistent differences in emphasis 
placed on adherence to group norms among those of the fundamentalist 
religions and members of the latitudinarian sects. We may be reasonably 
TABLE III 
Confessional Attachment of Major Groups Defined by Religious Background, 1970 
K 
Attend Church: Always 51% 44% 
Usually 19 16 
Sometimes 1 3  11 
Seldom 7 7  
10 8 Never - 
100 
No religious preference 1 3  
100 
Number of Wspondents (735) 
- 
DR 
22% 17% 
14 10 
18 13 
20 15 
26 20 - 
100 
25 
100 
(465) 
Total 
C Cases Percent 
61% 53% (487) 35 
25 22 (204) 15 
9 8 (155) 11 
1 * (120) 9 
4 3 (158) 12 - 
100 
14 (240) 18 
100 100 
(164) (1364) 
- - 
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comfortable in assuming that almost all of the departures from earlier 
acceptance of religious norms are embedded or reflected in the distribu- 
tions of limited confessional attachment. However, we cannot assume 
that the report of religious homogeneity in home and school indicates a 
completely uniform degree of religious socialization and, therefore, an 
unambiguous base for the measurements of initial attachments. Conse- 
quently, we cannot assume that all subsequent reports of nonatten- 
dance or nonidentification within the three religious groups must re- 
flect change during the adult lifetime of the person r e p ~ r t i n g . ~  
Confessional Voting in 1970 
Religious group differences in gross voting patterns in the 1970 pro- 
vincial elections, as presented in Table IV, are thoroughly familiar to 
students of recent Dutch politics. The Calvinist vote was heavily confes- 
sional (Anti-Revolutionary Party or ARP), the nonreligious vote even 
more strongly secular, the Catholic vote predominantly confessional 
(Catholic People’s Party or KVP) and the Dutch Reformed vote almost 
as secular as the Catholic vote was confessional. Data from 1966 origi- 
nally reported in God in Nederland by Zeegers et al., (1967) provide a 
base that suggests that 1970 saw a continuation of depillarization of the 
Catholic vote, while the votes of our other three groups apparently 
TABLE IV 
1970 Provincial Election Vote, by Religious Background 
K DR C NR 
Confessional* 34% 23% 62% 2% 
Other 35 53 28 69 
Non Vote 29 19 10 23 
6 Refused to Answer, DK, NA 2 5 
100 100 100 100 
Number of Respondents (735) (465) (164) (132) 
1 out of 507K voted ARP or CHU 
3 out of 364 DR voted KVP 
0 out of 142 C voted KVP or CHU 
- 2 out of 102 NR voted KVP, ARP or CHU 
6 out of 1115 voters crossedreligious lines 
* 
- - - - 
* The Confessional Parties represented in the table include: KVP, Katholieke ‘Volkspartij; 
ARP, Anti-Revolutionaire Partij; CHU, Christelijk Historische Unie, SGP, Staatkundig Gerefor- 
meerde Partij; and GPV, Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond. 
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remained stable in their divison between the confessional and the secu- 
lar parties. A still earlier base provided by the Lijphart (1974) and 
Wolinetz (1973) reanalyses of 1956 data provides perhaps the clearest 
evidence that depillarization (declining strength of church-related orga- 
nizations including the confessional parties) has taken place in Dutch 
politics, whether or not there has also been deconfessionalization (de- 
clining individual religious attachment) of a comparable magnitude. In 
1956, voters among the Catholics and Calvinists were apparently almost 
monolithic in their support of the appropriate confessional parties. By 
1970 the Catholic vote for the KVP had dropped from the 84% of all 
Catholics as recorded in 1956 to only 59%; the Calvinist vote was down 
from 80% voting ARP to barely 70% in 1970. Even the Dutch Re- 
formed support for their confessional parties (Christian Historical 
Union and ARP) showed a comparable proportional drop from 39% in 
1956 to 23% in 1970, a decline of 40% in votes cast for confessional 
parties to more than match the 35% decrease in Catholic votes for the 
KVP and the 13% decline in Calvinist ARP voting. 
Whatever the magnitude of deconfessionalization or depillarization 
between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, one aspect of segmental 
division along religious lines did not change. Although only 34% of the 
Catholic group being studied in 1970 reported voting and voting KVP, 
only one Catholic out of the total 507 who reported voting, voted for 
any other confessional party - one vote for the CHU. More than half of 
the Dutch Reformed voted for some party other than CHU or ARP, but 
only 3 out of 364 Dutch Reformed voters voted KVP. Not one of the 
142 Calvinist voters admitted to  a KVP or CHU vote iil 1970, and only 
2 out of 102 nonreligious voters voted for any confessional party. In 
sum, only 6 out of 1 115 voters crossed traditional confessionaZ lines in 
their 1970 vote. The pillars that once supported the religious parties 
may be crumbling but the historic boundaries separating them remain 
as inviolate as ever. Catholics and Protestants alike may share a growing 
sense that political salvation may be found outside their own confes- 
sional communities, but the freedom to go outside one’s own religious 
community is not matched by freedom to enter another. As we shall 
note shortly, the same strictures held in 1972, with the inevitable con- 
sequence that the confessional parties as a group again lost popular 
support in that year. 
Perspectives on Change in Confessional Voting 
The unidirectional flow of voters away from the confessional parties 
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forces attention in two directions: looking back to the source of the 
problem, how does one account for and understand the decline of 
confessional party strength? Looking forward, what are the likely con- 
sequences of a continuation of the massive desertions that have brought 
the confessional vote down from its post-war high of 53% in 1948 to  
only 32% in 1972? In the most general terms, the origin of the decline 
might be found in any of three, nonexclusive, types of change. First, 
with no change in the level o f  confessional attachment within any of 
the major religious groupings, a diminution of the bond between reli- 
gion and politics could account for the precipitous decline in confes- 
sional voting. Second, with no change in the correlation between con- 
fessional attachment and confessional voting, confessional voting could 
decline just because confessional attachment itself has declined. In the 
third case, both level of confessional attachment and level of confes- 
sional voting could change, with no change in their relationship. 
Just as the status polarization of political partisanship may surge and 
ebb with shifts in the congruence of political and class alignments, so 
too the correlation between confessional attachment and confessional 
voting may grow and decline with no change occurring either in the 
general level of politicization or in the level of confessional attachment 
(see Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 333-377). Accounting for a decline in 
confessional voting through a reduction in the religious relevance of 
politics, expressed as a reduction in the correlation between confes- 
sional attachment and confessional voting, would, of course, mean dif- 
ferential change occurring along the dimension of confessional attach- 
ment. A decline in the strength of the relationship between religion and 
politics in the presence of a decline in confessional voting would neces- 
sarily mean a greater decline or reduction in confessional voting for 
those with the higher levels of confessional attachment. This would be 
accompanied by a smaller decline for the less attached who, presum- 
ably, are less united in confessional voting to  begin with precisely be- 
cause they feel less attached to the church of their choice and less 
obligated to vote the party line. This pattern of change (tl to  t 2  in 
Chart A) would seem to promise still more change to come, because it 
would mean an erosion of norms set and exemplified by the most 
faithful within the religious community. If those closest to the church 
decrease their commitment to  the church’s party, the less faithful may 
well feel an increased freedom to follow personal dictates of political 
interest, or disinterest, on election day. 
As a second stage in the dynamics of this type of change within a 
group, a decision of the more peripheral members of the group to  
desert the group’s party could, somewhat paradoxically, restore the 
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Chart A 
C 
0 __- -  
U 
6 
Low 
Low High 
Level of confessional 
attachment 
d votin original correlation between the confessional attachment but 
at the continued overall expense of the confessional party. At the end 
of this stage in the evolution of church-party relationship ( t 3  in Chart 
B), the more committed members of the religious community would 
Chart B 
LOW1 I 
LOW High 
Level of confessional 
at?achrnent 
once again be relatively more faithful supporters of the church’s party 
than those with lower levels of confessional attachment, but all would 
share in a lower level of support for the party. Whatever the starting 
point in the process, persons at every point on the gradient of confes- 
sional attachment would, at the end of this process, give less weight to 
confessional concerns and more weight to  other factors in coming to 
their decision to  vote. And during such a process of political depillariza- 
tion, the correlations between confessional attachment and confessional 
voting could be expected to first drop and then rise if those most 
committed were the first to change and the least committed followed 
their example. 
An initial increase in the confessional attachment-confessional vote 
correlation could occur at the beginning of a period of decline in con- 
fessional voting, but it would mean that the process of change within 
the group was beginning with defection or rebellion at the periphery, 
among those least attached (as in tl to  t 2 .  in Chart C). The correlation 
would increase if those most closely attached to  the church maintained 
a high level of confessional voting while the less closely attached accen- 
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Chart C 
High 
I 
0 , 
. 
Low 
LOW high 
Level of confessional 
attachment 
tuated their difference from the more attached by giving m ich 1 ss 
support to the party of the church. 
Change initiated by those less attached to the church would, how- 
ever, seem more likely to occur in the form of the second and quite 
different general type of change suggested a t  the beginning of this 
section. This would take the form of widespread loosening of ties to  the 
church and a decrease in extent of  confessional attachment. This 
would, of course, first produce a change in the distribution of confes- 
sional attachment, the consequence of deconfessionalization. The par- 
ticular sequence envisioned might then find persons who already feel 
only a limited attachment to the church concluding that dissatisfactions 
with their confessional party are further cause for confessional estrange- 
ment and therefore reason for deserting both church and party at the 
same time. 
If, however, the causes for dissatisfaction with party were not lo- 
cated primarily among marginal confessors but impinged equally across 
the entire continuum of confessional attachment, a third possibility for 
the locus of initial change would occur. The general level of confes- 
sional voting could drop along with a general decrease in attachment 
and the relational bond between confessional attachment and confes- 
sional voting need not be seriously altered. This would produce t2 in 
Chart D. 
Low High 
Level of cwfessional 
attachment 
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Thiq third, quite different scenario, a scenario suggesting a change in 
level or  distribution of confessional attachment that does not seriously 
alter the confessional attachment-confessional vote correlation, rests 
on a severe assumption. That assumption is that change, or likelihood 
of change, in confessional attachment is largely unrelated t o  the inten- 
sity of attachment. To put the problem in its negative form, if those 
most closely attached to  a particular church have other distinctive so- 
cial or personal attributes associated with resistance to change, it is 
comrncnsurately less likely that their sense of attachment will be open 
to  erosion and decay. Thinking for a moment about party identifica- 
tion, we know that strength or  intensity of identification is strongly 
correlated with age and social status which are, in turn, indicators of 
generalized resistance t o  change. Consequently, strong identifiers are 
much less susceptible to change than are those weakly associated with a 
party. It follows that most of the change in level of party identification 
can be expected, and found, among those less intensely attached, such 
as the young. Comparable differences in attributes for high and low 
levels of confessional attachment would lead us to rule out any expecta- 
tion that deconfessionalization would occur uniformly among those 
with high and low attachment alike and therefore would not alter the 
magnitude of other correlated differences such as those found in voting 
for confessional parties. 
This highly speculative line of thought has been introduced to  high- 
light the importance of knowing more about the correlates of confes- 
sional attachment and its relationship to  confessional voting. The pre- 
sent discussion, and its successors more directly focused on the changes 
subsumed under the concept of depillarization, can lead to  a fuller 
explication of the changes occurring in confessional voting only as we 
have a more complete understanding of the origin and dynamics of the 
changes being studied. 
The work of Lijphart, Wolinetz and others has indicated sharp differ- 
ences in confessional voting associated with regularity in church atten- 
dance. Our line of inquiry builds on this evidence and now extends it to 
permit a closer scrutiny of the political significance of confessional 
attachment. 
The Political Significance of Confessional Attachment 
The provincial elections of 1970 provide the basis for our first sys- 
tematic view of the political correlates of confessional attachment. A 
joint examination of turnout, confessional voting and secular voting, 
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TABLE V 
1970 Vote by Confessional Attachment, for Persons with Homogeneous Religious Background 
Catholics 
Always Usually 
Voted 
Confessional 52% 41% 
Other 27 28 
Non-Vo te 19 28 
3 Other 
100 100 
-2 -
Number of 
Cases (324) (122) 
Dutch Reformed 
Voted 
Confessional 60% 57% 
Other 30 26 
Non-Vote 9 17 
Other - 1 -  0 
100 100 
Number of 
Cases (77) (47) 
Calvinist 
Voted 
Confessional 76% 71% 
Other 21 14 
Non-Vote 3 15 
Other 
100 100 
Number of 
Cases (86) (35) 
* * - - 
Non-religious 
Voted 
Confessional 
Other 
Non-Vote 
Other 
Number of Respondents 
Sometimes 
19% 
46 
35 
1 
100 
(81) 
-
23% 
57 
12 
8 
100 
(61) 
-
62% 
23 
15 
0 
100 
(13) 
Seldom 
14% 
3 1  
49 
6 
100 
(49) 
- 
6% 
60 
24 
10 
100 
(70) 
-
Never 
13% 
44 
43 
0 
100 
(63) 
-
11% 
63 
22 
4 
100 
(90) 
-
Non-religious Total 
0% 34%- 
57 35 
41  29 
2 
100 100 
- 2 _. 
(96) '(73.5) 
4% 23% 
67 53 
26 19 
5 
100 100 
-3 - 
10% 
67 
23 
100 
(30) 
* - 
62% 
28 
10 * 
* =  no cases 
0 = rounded off to zero 
with data as displayed in Table V, sharpens our understanding of con- 
fessional attachment in a number of domains, We may note first that 
confessional attachment as measured is a continuum with a systematic 
variation in voting behavior associated with variation in level of attach- 
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ment. Within each of our three religious groups there is a steady decline 
in confessional voting as one moves from those most closely attached to  
the church to those least attached to  the church of their childhood. 
This relationship is complemented by two other correlations: the 
vote for the secular parties tends to increase with each decrease in 
confessional attachment, and the decision not to participate in the 
electoral voting alsp increases quite systematically and dramatically. 
Although less attention has been directed to the participatory implica- 
tions of deconfessionalization, we now have striking evidence that non- 
voting is at least a correlate of weak confessional attachment. Under the 
relatively new rules of the electoral game in The Netherlands, the con- 
test is not a zero sum game of the confessional parties against the 
secular; the third option of not voting at all appears to increase in 
attractiveness as confessional attachment declines. 
The information about nonvoting may also cast some light on the 
question of whether we are simply noting correlates of a static and 
continuing state of affairs concerning confessional attachment or 
whether we are also observing the consequences of real change and 
deconfessionalization. Perhaps the most provocative lead concerns non- 
voting among the nonreligious. Nonvoting among the first generation 
nonreligious within the three confessional groups (41 % among former 
Catholics, 26% among former Dutch Reformed and 34% among former 
Calvinists) tends to be greater than nonvoting in the group composed of 
the second generation nonreligious (23% nonvoting). The higher rate of 
nonvoting among the nonreligious with confessional backgrounds sug- 
gests rebellion or active rejection rather than long standing apathy to- 
ward a system traditionally based on church-related pillars of social 
organization and political expression. 
Preliminary investigations suggest strong confirmation of this hy- 
pothesis. In response to  a series of questions about electoral reform, the 
three newly deconfessionalized sets of electors gave much stronger sup- 
port for electoral reform than did their former co-religionists, while at 
the same time the second generation nonreligious gave much less sup- 
port to reform, matphing the average for the total population on these 
questions just as they matched the national figure on nonvoting. Other 
indications of civic concern such as general interest in politics and 
interest in the provincial elections themselves, participation in political 
discussions, and use of the mass media to follow political affairs also 
run counter to the hypothesis that the recently deconfessionalized were 
simply reflecting lifelong disinterest in politics when they chose not to  
vote. Although much more study is needed, our tentative conclusion is 
that the absence of religious preference on their part is the direct result 
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of recent rejection of prior religious identifications. If so, they may give 
us a better indication of the likely immediate consequences of further 
deconfessionalization for the nation’s politics than do the second gener- 
ation nonreligious. 
The patterning of the 1970 vote among the three confessional parties 
brings us back to  some of our earlier speculations. Although the Dutch 
Reformed are the weakest in confessional attachment and in confes- 
sional voting, the political meaning of variation in their confessional 
attachment seems every bit as clear for them as for the other two 
groups. The correlation between confessional attachment and confes- 
sional voting is, if anything, marginally higher for the Dutch Reformed 
than for the Catholics. In particular, those more closely attached to  the 
church set a clear standard with 3 out of every 5 votes going to a 
Protestant confessional party while the KVP receives no more than 2 
out of every 4 votes cast by Catholics with a comparable level of 
confessional attachment. 
Although we shall not at this point attempt a systematic reconstruc- 
tion of recent changes in the confessional vote, it should be noted that 
the decline of the Catholic vote for the KVP since 1956 doubtless has 
meant a reduction in the confessional attachment-confessional vote 
correlation (depillarization) as well as some loss through decreased at- 
tachment (deconfessionalization). Noting the sharp differences in the 
levels of confessional voting for Catholics against both the Dutch Re- 
formed and Calvinists within the comparable top two categories of 
attachment, one may wonder whether the strength of the KVP might 
not continue to decline, after the model represented by Chart B, even 
without any significant decrease in confessional attachment or increase 
in deconfessionalization. Certainly among those professing the highest 
degree of religious identity the relevance of a confessional vote for 
confessional attachment is already much lower among Catholics than in 
either of the other two groups, and we will shortly note a similar 
pattern in the parliamentary elections of 1972. 
The Social Correlates of Confessional Attachment 
With the relevance of confessional attachment for confessional voting 
now partially in view, attention can be given to  the location of confes- 
sjonal attachments in the broader social structure. A number of expec- 
tations guide our inquiry. For example, we would expect increased age 
to be a correlate of closer confessional attachment. To the extent that 
the churches are conserving institutions, a part of the establishment of a 
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TABLE VI 
Age as a Correlate of Confessional Attachment, 1970 
-~ 
Catholics 
Young Old 
Often Attend* 51% 52% 617’ 71% 68% 
Attend Less Frequently** 22% 24 17 11 14 
Do Not Attend 11 9 8 8 7 
11 No Religious Preference 
100 100 100 100 100 
Number of Respondents (87) (193) (157) (127) (169) 
- -10 -15 14 -16 -
Dutch Reformed 
Often Attend* 31% 25% 
Attend Less Frequently** 25 30 
Do Not Attend 21 16 
29 No Religious Preference 23 
100 100 
Number of Respondents (39) (90) 
--
23% 30% 26% 
27 32 25 
20 17 23 
26 21 30 
100 100 100 
(149) (73) (114) 
---
- 
* Always and Usually, combined 
** Sometimes and Seldom, combined 
society, we might also expect higher social status to  be associated with 
greater confessional attachment. And with urbanization as the source 
and site of social change, we might expect strong confessional attach- 
ments to predominate in rural communities. 
Our inquiry, first at the level of simple zero-order or bivariate rela- 
tionships and later at the level of multivariate analysis, confirms some 
expectations but fails to  support others. The correlation of confessional 
attachment and age is reasonably typical of the entire set of relation- 
ships explored. As Table VI discloses, older Catholics were, indeed, 
more likely to report close confessional attachments than were the 
younger. The age-related differences in confessional attachment among 
Catholics were not extreme, but they were matched by observed differ- 
ences among Calvinists, where only 45% of the younger but 64% of the 
older Calvinists reported regular church attendance. Among the Dutch 
Reformed, however, our expectations were not met at all. Table VI 
shows absolutely no systematic variation in their confessional attach- 
ment associated with differences in age. ’ 
In general, the prime indicators of social cleavages or individual dif- 
ferences, such as class and sex, bore expected but very subdued confir- 
mation for our expectations. More positive confirmations were pro- 
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TABLE VII 
Urbanization and Early Attendance at Confessional School as Correlates of Confessional Attach- 
ment, 1970 
~~ ~ ~~~ ~~ 
Catholics 
Metro Urban 
No No 
Church Church Church Church 
School School School School 
Often Attend * 42% 
Attend Less Often** 18 
Do Not Attend 16 
No Religious Prefer- 
ence 24 
26% 
24 
10 
40 
100 
Number of 
Respondents (141) 
Attend Often* 32% 
Attend Less Often** 40 
Do Not Attend 17 
No Religious 
11 Preference 
100 
__ 
Number of 
Respondents (40) 
100 
(41 1 
11% 
21 
24 
44 
100 
(72) 
63% 50% 
21 23 
7 16 
9 11 
100 100 
- ~ 
Dutch Reformed 
39% 15% 
29 21 
11 3 1  
33 
100 100 
- -21 
(105) (117) 
Church 
School 
87% 
8 
1 
4 
100 
(120) 
~~~ 
-
55% 
16 
14 
15 
100 
(44) 
-
Rural 
No 
Church 
School 
77% 
10 
7 
6 
100 
22% 
45 
16 
17 
100 
-
* Always and Usually 
** Sometimes and Seldom 
vided by the joint consideration of urbanization of place of residence 
and childhood attendance at confessional school. Table VII presents the 
data for Catholics and Dutch Reformed. 
Although attendance at confessional school was used to define our 
four analytic groups, and variance in current confessional attachment 
associated with early differences in school experience within the groups 
might be expected to be attenuated, church school attendance in child- 
hood is nevertheless associated with stronger confessional attachment 
years later among adults, and particularly so for members of the Dutch 
Reformed community. Among residents of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
The Hague (the Metro dwellers in Table VII), early attendance at 
church school was a conserving, maintaining support for confessional 
attachment among Catholics as well, but its continued influence on 
Catholics residing in rural areas was very limited. The major source of 
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the latter limitation, of course, is found in the close approximation to 
the J-curve of conforming behavior exhibited by all rural Catholics. 
Within both the Catholic and Dutch Reformed groups, the differences 
in attachment of extreme subsets (rural with confessional school and 
urban with no confessional school) are most impressive. Moreover, 
these differences - and the correlations they imply - persist despite 
simultaneous consideration of other social structural factors with which 
they are also correlated. 
To test the correlations of urbanization and church school atten- 
dance against the possibility that their contribution to confessional 
attachment was only apparent, an artifact of their relationship with 
other aspects of social structure, a multivariate analysis with six addi- 
tional factors was carried out. Except for the place of residence (urban- 
ization) variable, none of the structural indicators to  be examined were 
selected to identify the origins of deconfessionalization. Rather, they 
were chosen because our expectations were that the old, the women, 
the married, those who hadattended church school, the less well edu- 
cated or the occupants of positions of high status might be the sources 
of resistance to change; we had no expectation of achieving a better 
understanding of why the young, the men or the single might be im- 
pelled toward change. Only urbanization of residence was initially 
thought to reflect a possible source of change in confessional attach- 
ment. 
The simultaneous inspection of independent effects was carried out 
with a multiple regression analysis of eight predictors of confessional 
attachment. Although most of the results, presented in Table VIII fit 
our first expectations, the degree of fit is surprising in its modesty. We 
must conclude that sex, age, subjective social class identification, occu- 
pational and marital status are at best only slightly correlated with the 
degree of confessional attachment. Across all three groups the magni- 
tudes of the correlations (with two or three exceptions) are small in- 
deed. In additive combination they provide a statistical accounting for 
only a minor part of the variance in confessional attachment. Where the 
political behavior correlates of confessional attachment were of a mag- 
nitude to encourage speculation about the consequences for a nation’s 
politics, the social correlates tell us much less of substance about the 
social structuring of confessional attachment or about social constraints 
on deconfessionalization. Only the degree of urbanization of place of 
residence and the historical attendance at church school are strongly 
correlated with confessional attachment. 
The absence of other strong correlates may bz quite important to our 
theoretical understanding of the processes that are leading to deconfes- 
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TABLE VIII 
Multivariate Analysis of Social Correlates Of Confessional Attachment, 1970 (Entries me beta 
weights) 
Catholic Dutch Reformed Calvinist 
Sex: Male 
Female 0.05* 0.06 0.05 
Age: Old 0.14** 0.04 
Young 0.05 
Education: Low 0.02 
High 0.05* 0.06 
Subjective Class: Low 
High 0.09' 0.07* 0.04 
Occupational Status: Low 
High 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Married: Yes 0.08 
No 0.11** 0.04 
Attended Confessional School: Yes 0.10** 0.27** 0.48** 
No 
Urbanization: Metro 
Rural 0.36** 0.17** 0.22** 
R 0.4 1 0.35 0.56 
Number of Respondents (735) (465) (164) 
* Signifcant between 0.03 - 0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
All entries are presented as positively correlated with one or the other end of the continuum 
describing each independent variable or predictor. 
sionalization. These data suggest the importance of one of the altema- 
tive views of the possible or likely incidence of change in confessional 
attachment discussed earlier. With these results before us, it is now 
much more possible to  think of confessional attachment as a private, 
personal decision of conscience and social value that is not strongly 
influenced by social location or condition. Quite contrary to our under- 
standing of partisan identification, strength of confessional attachment 
is neither bolstered nor threatened by the pervasive cleavages that im- 
pinge on so many other social or political decisions. There may indeed 
be, in general, great freedom of individual choice, with most of the 
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usual attributes of social position that would restrain a decision to  
change, to deconfessionalize, quite limited in their effects. If so, confes- 
sional voting may swell or  diminish without permanently altering the 
correlation between confessional attachment and the confessional vote 
because confessional attachment may be open to  change among those 
whose attachments are strong as well as among those whose attach- 
ments are weak. 
The one contemporary element in our analysis of confessional at- 
tachment that was found relevant to change in confessional attachment 
was the degree of urbanization of one’s place of residence. One inter- 
pretation of the data leads to the hypothesis that confessional attach- 
ment, reflected in church attendance, might be influenced by local 
community norms. If this be true, then we should find changes in the 
degree of urbanization of one’s residence associated with appropriate 
diffeyences in the level of confessional attachment. Given the apparent 
rural norm of regular church attendance, persons who have moved from 
the city to the countryside should be more regular in their attendance 
than the city dwellers they left behind (and, inferentially, than they 
themselves had been when they were city dwellers). In the other direc- 
tion, a residential move from the closeknit communities of the country- 
side to the anonymity of the Big City should be reflected in a much less 
regular pattern of attendance than exhibited by those remaining in the 
rural commune. 
As with our assessment of change in confessional attachment, our 
measure of residential change is based on a comparison between only 
one earlier point in time and the present. Each person in our study was 
classified in terms of the urbanization of his or  her place of residence 
during adolescence, between the ages of 10 and 16. Using birth dates 
and census documents from past decades, Professor Rusk established 
the degree of urbanization of earlier residences in terms commensurate 
with current distinctions. A summary of the information about the 
stability and change in residential environment is presented in Table 
IXa. The two noteworthy facts in that table are: 1) there are no signifi- 
cant differences among the three confessional groups, and 2) with an 
expected preponderance of change favoring greater urbanization, there 
are enough instances of out-migration from the cities and urban centers 
to permit a relatively full test of our speculation. 
Table IXb strongly supports our major hypothesis that confessional 
attachment changes as one changes residential communities and experi- 
ences new religious community norms for church attendance. First, it is 
evident that behavioral standards within each of the confessional groups 
vary sharply by degree of urbanization for those who live in residential 
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TABLE 1% 
Change in Urbanization of Residence, Childhood to Adulthood, for Major Religious Groups 
Always Metro 
Urban 
Rural 
Catholic 
15% 
34 
16 
65% 
From Less Urban to More Urban 
From Less Rural to More Rural 
23% 
12 
35% 
Dutch Reformed 
12% 
28 
25 
65% 
23% 
12 
35% 
Calvinist 
11% 
31 
24 
66% 
20% 
14 
34% 
_______~ ___ 
TABLE IXb 
Confessional Attachment as a Correlate of Change in Urbanization of Residence 
Always Metro -14* -59 -28 
Urban +41 -13 + 44 
Rural + 87 1 + a4 
From Less Urban to More Urban + 45 -14 + 64 
From Less Rural to More Rural + 41 -30 + 52 
* Entry is a mean score for confessional attachment; it is the proportion of those who attend 
always or usually minus those who never attend’or have no religious preference. 
contexts similar to those in which they were reared. Catholics, in par- 
ticular, present a very sharp contrast between the metropolian and rural 
settings, with the urban dwellers of medium sized cities falling rather 
neatly between the two extremes. Among the Dutch Reformed and the 
Calvinists, residents of the metropolitan centers are sharply different 
from the remainder, with the smaller differences between the urban and 
rural dwellers still consistent with our expectations. 
Within all three groups, the specific locus of residential change is 
remarkably similar; most movement from less urbanized to  more urban- 
ized communities is in fact from rural to  urban, and most movement 
from more urbanized to less urbanized places is fvom the metropolitan 
centers to  smaller cities. These uniformities facilitate our interpretation 
of Table IXb. Catholics moving from smaller to  larger places have a 
mean score on Confessional Attachment that is some 40 points lower 
than the rural score but almost identical with the “core” urban score. 
The Dutch Reformed moving to  the urban areas show a score 15 points 
lower than that for rural residents but, as with the Catholics, their level 
almost exactly matches the level of core urban attachment. Calvinists 
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show the least decline, 20 points (from +84 to +64) and those moving 
to  the cities maintain a level of attachment that is clearly higher than 
the general level in their new environments although lower than that 
they left behind. 
Movement away from the metropolitan and urban centers produces a 
nicely complementary picture. The confessional attachment score for 
Catholics who have left the metropolis is 55 points higher than for 
those who have stayed behind, and the movers are just as faithful as the 
long-time urban dweller. The magnitude of comparable differences is 
similar for the Dutch Reformed. Those who have moved to  smaller 
places show an attachment score 29 points higher than the lifelong 
metropolitan dwellers, although their attachment lags behind that of 
their new neighbors among the constant urban residents. Calvinists who 
have moved out into less densely populated areas show a much larger 
degree of changed attachment than did their co-religionists who moved 
into the cities. and with the imputed changes again almost perfectly 
consonant with the hypothesized importance of local norms. In short, 
six of six comparisons are consistent with the hypothesis that confes- 
sional attachment is heavily influenced by established local group 
norms of behavior and will change as residential movement confronts a 
person with a new set of norms. 
If the preceding analysis has led to correct inferences, social norms 
rather than nonreligious cleavage structures dominate stability and 
change in confessional attachment. Insofar as the norms of religious 
allegiance are tied to a sense of community or lack of community, 
residential mobility may be playing a major role in shaping the future 
of both church and church related politics. And if increasing urbaniza- 
tion continues to  be the dominant pattern of population movement, a 
continued trend away from the churches and their confessional parties 
would seem likely to  f o l l ~ w . ~  
The Political Correlates of Confessional Attachment, 1972 
For a more complete examination of the political consequences of 
inferred deconfessionalization we turn to the parliamentary elections of 
1972. The basic contours of the relationship between confessional at- 
tachment and electoral behavior are much the same in 1972 as they 
were in 1970. However, there are some differences that may be largely 
a commentary on the difference between provincial and parliamentary 
elections and, as such, are not of concern in this discussion since we do 
not intend to document or explain differences between types of elec- 
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TABLE X 
1972 Vote by Religious Backgrounds for Four Major Groups 
K DR C N-R 
Confessional* 42% 
Left* 27 
Other* 18 
NV 11 
2 Ref, DK, NA 
100 
Number of Respondents (550) 
-
22% 
41 
27 
7 
3 
100 
(321) 
- 
72% 
14 
9 
4 
1 
100 
(123) 
__ 
3% 
63 
23 
10 
1 
100 
(94) 
-
* Only 14 out of 905 voters from homogeneous religious backgrounds crossed religious lines: 
9 out of 490 K voted ARP or CHU 
2 out of 303 DR voted KVP 
3 out of 11 2 C voted KVP or CHU 
Confessional parties again include KVP, ARP, CHU, SGP and GPV, as in Table IV. The left in- 
cludes: PvdA, Partij van de Arbeid, CPN, Communistische Partij Nederland; PPR, Palitieke 
Partij Radicalen; PSP, Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij, and D’66, Democraten ’66. The “Other” 
category is a residual group ranging from the Center to the Right and includes the VVD, Volks- 
partij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; DS ‘70, Democratisch Socialisten ’70; BP, Boeren Partij; 
NMP; and CDU. 
tions. But to the extent this is so, the parliamentary elections seem a 
better - a more familiar and more thoroughly understood - base for an 
extension of this exploratory inquiry than the provincial elections. 
A comparison of relevant data for the 1972 parliamentary elections 
(Table X with Table IV) indicates something of the pervasiveness of the 
political correlates of confessional attachment, as well as some of the 
sources of variation. Within each confessional group, roughly similar 
proportions supported their respective confessional political parties in 
both election years. In 1970, however, nonvoting was much higher than 
in 1972. Therefore, the aggregate differences between the two elections 
consist in part of a trade-off between nonvoting and voting for the 
nonconfessional parties. In the parliamentary election of 1972, as ear- 
lier, votes the confessional parties lost did not stray across confessional 
lines but went almost exclusively to  secular parties, or into the absten- 
tion from voting. 
Despite the increases in voter turnout in 1972 over 1970, the correla- 
tion between nonvoting and strength of confessional attachment is still 
evident as the parliamentary elections are compared to the provincial 
elections of two years earlier. The greater detail presented in Table XI 
(compared to Table V) does, however, expose another, even stronger, 
association with confessional attachment: there is a strong negative 
TABLE XI 
Confessional Attachment as a Correlate of the 1972 Vote for Parliament 
Catholics 
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never No Religious Total 
Pref. 
1972 Vote: 
Confessional 61% 47% 29% 23% 14% 3% 42% 
Left 14 24 43 26 44 54 27 
Other 15 17 17 29 21 26 18 
Non-Vote 8 11 9 22 21 14 11 
Refused, 
NA, DK 2 1 2 0 0 3 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of 
Respondents (259) (92) (59) (39) (44) (60) (550) 
7% of Total 47 17 11 6 8 11 100 
Group 
Dutch Reformed 
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never No Reli&ous Total 
~- 
1912 Vote: 
Confessional 65% 50% 
Left 8 26 
Other 19 18 
Non-Vote 4 0 
Refused, 
6 NA, DK 4 
100 100 
Number of 
Respondents (48) (34) 
- -
16% 
25 
49 
5 
5 
100 
-
(43) 
Ref. 
18% 3% 4% 22% 
39 68 57 4 1  
32 19 23 27 
I 8 13 7 
3 
100 100 100 100 
-3 -2 -4 -
% of Total 
Group 15 11 13 18 19 24 100 
Calvinist 
Always Usually Infrequent Never No Religious Pref. Total 
1972 Vote: 
Confessional 88% 
Left 6 
Other 6 
Non-Vote 0 
Refused, 
0 NA, DK 
100 
Number of 
Respondents (67) 
-
75% 
17 
4 
0 
4 
100 
-
37% 72% 
28 14 
19 9 
16 4 
0 
100 
1 
100 
-
%of Total 
Group 58 20 22 100 
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correlation of confessional attachment with voting for parties of the 
left. The left does less well than the secular center and right among the 
minority of the closely attached who defect to vote outside their con- 
fessional party; but the immense nonconfessional vote of those with 
confessional origins who 110 longer attend church service or who deny a 
personal religious preference goes to parties of the left in ratios of 
better than 2 to 1, There is a mild and somewhat irregular tendency for 
the secular non-left to gain votes as the level of confessional attachment 
decreases, but the striking regularity is the much larger and virtually 
monotonic increase in support for the parties, often new parties, of the 
left. 
The most dramatic message conveyed by Table XI describes the ex- 
tent to which voting for a confessional party is tied to the level of 
confessional attachment. The strength of the association is just as 
strong in the context of a national parliamentary election as it is in the 
provincial elections. If level of confessional attachment is, for the mem- 
bers of our three groups, a reflection of deconfessionalization, further 
movement toward deconfessionalization must indeed bode ill for the 
major confessional parties. And with the religious pillars playing a less 
and less central role in defining the dimensions of the Dutch party 
system (Daalder and Rusk, 1972), it becomes even more important to 
understand the specific political consequences of deconfessionalization. 
The search for a more adequate understanding could, and ultimately 
must, follow a number of quite different courses. However, our present 
inquiry is limited to three aspects of the voting decision: the decision to  
vote or abstain, the decision to support one’s confessional party or 
defect, and, for those who defect, the decision to vote for a party of 
the left or for some other secular party. Our line of inquiry is also 
limited to a concern with the basic indicators of location in the social 
structure. Questions of changing values attached to religious, political 
and other social behavior are reserved for future study. Similarly, we 
shall not explore those belief systems responsible for stability and 
change in political and religious behavior. On a more detailed level, we 
shall test neither the inferential connections between the static level of 
confessional attachment and the dynamic process of deconfessionaliza- 
tion nor the linkage between deconfessionalization and the subsequent 
depillarization that deprives church-centered social, economic or politi- 
cal institutions of their traditional support. 
THE DECISION TO VOTE 
In electoral research it has always been easier to  account for partisan 
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preferences of voters than to explain the decision to vote or abstain. 
The recent book by Verba and Nie (1972) on Participation in America 
performs an invaluable service in delineating the complexity of the 
processes involved in political participation and argues persuasively the 
role of each of the many factors that are relevant to a full understand- 
ing of the phenomenon. A maximum effort to account for turnout 
(voting and nonvoting) in the parliamentary elections of 1972 would 
take us well beyond the purpose of this paper. Consequently, we have 
largely limited our assessment of the role of confessional attachment in 
facilitating the decision to  vote to an examination that takes into ac- 
count the seven nonreligious factors considered in the earlier analysis of 
the social correlates of confessional attachment. However, two further 
measures of social attachment that may be relevant to social and politi- 
cal participation have been added. Given the history of the pillarization 
of social organization in the Netherlands, it seems appropriate to con- 
sider the possibility that membership of trade unions, professional or- 
ganizations and other voluntary social groups could affect, and perhaps 
offset, the decline in church-related influences on political participa- 
tion. Measures of such memberships have been added to our analysis of 
the 1972 election. Finally, attendance a t  church school was retained as 
an independent source of “explanation.” Even though it is not neces- 
sarily a good measure of current social location, nor a good indicator of 
current exposure to socio-religious influences, it nonetheless may re- 
flect aspects of pillarization and therefore is added to the measures of 
membership in our strategy for isolating the effects of confessional 
attachment . 
Our analytic strategy is to examine the relationship of confessional 
attachment to voting turnout while simultaneously taking account of 
the contribution of the other ten variables to the same act of voting or 
not voting. This strategy permits a judgment about the magnitude of 
the direct relationship between confessional attachment and voting. It 
neither forecloses nor tests the possibility that confessional attachment 
is a mediating or intervening variable crucial to the act of voting but not 
directly or proximally influential. This latter possibility is best illus- 
trated by the data pertaining to the Catholic group presented in Table 
XII.8 Despite a quite clear “zero order” correlation in the bivariate 
displays of nonvoting in Table XI, the correlation between confessional 
attachment and nonvoting of Catholics disappears when other factors 
related to Catholic turnout are taken into account. Age, sex, education 
and early attendance at a Catholic school are visible determinants of the 
level of confessional attachment (see Table VIII) and of turnout; but, 
formally speaking, confessional attachment itself appears to be a me- 
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TABLE XI1 
Multivariate Analysis of Turnout (Vote/Non-Vote) in 1972 Parliamentary Elections 
Catholic Dutch Reformed 
Sex: Male 0.01 
Female 0.06 
Age: Old 0.11** 0.01 
Young 
Education: Low 
High 0.21** 0.11* 
Subjective Social Class: Low 0.14** 
High 0.09 
Occupational Status: Low 0.08 
High 0.07 
Married: Yes 0.22*’ 
No 0.06 
Attended Church School: Yes 0.12** 
No 0.05 
Confessional Attachment: High 0.03 0.13* 
Low 
Member of Trade Union or Professional 
Organization: No 
Yes 0.07 0.02 
Member of Other Voluntary Organization: No 0.02 
Yes 0.01 
Urbanization: Metro 
Rural 0.07 0.04 
Percent Not Voting 11 
Number of Respondents (550) 
R =  0.28 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
diating variable located somewhere in the causal sequence leading to the 
decision to vote or not vote, but not having any direct or independent 
bearing on that decision. For members of the Dutch Reformed group, 
however, the original simple relationship noted in Tables V and XI is 
not “explained away” by the introduction of other explanatory factors. 
246 
Confessional attachment remains one of the elements clearly and direct- 
ly associated with voting turnout - those closely attached to the 
church get out and vote, while the deconfessionalized tend not to vote. 
The smallest of our four analytic groups, the second generation non- 
religious, provides an interesting and potentially illuminating contrast 
with the Catholic and Dutch Reformed groups. Utilizing only the nine 
factors not explicitly related to ties with a church, it is possible to 
explain a much larger fraction of the variance in their turnout than the 
full set of eleven variables explains for the two religious groups exam- 
ined in Table XII. The multiple correlation coefficient for the nine-vari- 
able prediction of turnout for the nonreligious is 0.47; the eleven-vari- 
able predictions for the religious groups were 0.28 and 0.3 1. 
An even sharper contrast appears as we tighten the logic of the 
comparison. First, to contrast religious with nonreligious populations, it 
is necessary to  eliminate from the analysis of the religious groups the 
first generation nonreligious, the deconfessionalized members of the 
Catholic and Dutch Reformed groups who no longer profess any reli- 
gious preference. Second, to insure comparability in the multivariate 
determination of turnout, it is necessary to eliminate confessional at- 
tachment and attendance at confessional school as predictors of turn- 
out for those retained in each of the religious groups. As Table XI11 
indicates, these two constraints reduce the multiple correlation coeffi- 
cients to 0.22 for both Catholics and Dutch Reformed. The personal 
attributes that tend to define social location and experience remain 
very weak predictors of turnout for persons of the Catholic or Dutch 
Reformed faiths. As noted, however, the same attributes are significant- 
ly and strongly correlated with the turnout of the second generation 
nonreligious. 
The inquiry can be extended to embrace the two groups of first 
generation nonreligious (the “deconfessionalized” excluded in the tran- 
sition from Table XI1 to  Table XIII). The turnout of all three groups 
professing no religious preference (analyzed in Table XIV) is highly 
correlated with the selected personal attributes. The coefficients of 
multiple correlation are all more than twice as large for the nonreligious 
as for the religious. This striking difference in our ability to account for 
voting turnout of the religious and nonreligious clearly calls for further 
investigation. If the voting of the religious identifiers could have been 
accounted for at levels comparable to  those obtaining for the nonreli- 
gious with the inclusion of confessional attachment (as in Table XII) 
one could hypothesize that the institutional supports associated with 
the church are simply being replaced by secular social supports (such as 
the organization memberships reflected in Table XIV) as deconfession- 
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TABLE XI11 
Multivariate Analysis of Turnout (Vote/Non-Vote) in 1972, for Persons with Religious Prefer- 
ences, Using Non-Religious Predictors 
Catholics Dutch Reformed 
Sex: Male 0.01 
Female 0.06 
Age: Oid 0.10* 
Young 0.08 
Education: Low 0.02 
High 0.21** 
Class: Low 0.14** 
High 0.17* 
Occupation: Low 0.04 
High 0.07* 
Married: Yes 0.13* 
No 0.05 
Urbanization: Metro 
Rural 0.06 0.05 
Member of Other Voluntary Organization: No 0.02 
Yes 
0.05 
Member of Trade Union or 
Professional Organization: No 
Yes 0.06 0.02 
Percent Not Voting 1 1  7 
R =  
Number of Respondents 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
0.22 
(242) 
alization removes one from the direct influence of the church. How- 
ever, a quite different situation seems to  exist. Neither confessional 
attachment nor other group memberships give much evidence of direct 
support for political participation among those with a religious affilia- 
tion. Moreover, even the more familiar associations of sex, age, educa- 
tion and social class with voting or nonvoting are also virtually nonexis- 
tent for the religious groups. On the other hand, the social structural 
correlates of turnout among the nonreligious seem familiar and quite 
robust. Two of the strongest correlates, age and education, meet the 
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TABLE XIV 
Multivariate Analysis of Turnout (Vote/Non-Vote) in 1972 Parliamentary Elections, for Persons 
with No Religious Preference 
Second Generation Former Former 
Non-Religious Catholics Dutch Reformed 
Sex: Male 0.03 
Female 0.12 0.04 
0.22** 0.42** 0.23* ___-_- Age: Old 
Young 
Education: Low 
High 0.25** 0.28* 0.30** 
Subjective Social Class: Low 0.07 0.1 1 
High 0.14* 
Occupational Status: Low 0.07 
High 0.05 0.02 
Married: Yes 
No 0.07 0.22* 0.48** 
Urbanization: Metro 0.06 
Rural 0.37** 0.08 
Member of Trade Union or 
Professional Organization: No 0.09 
Yes 0.31** 0.18* 
Member of Voluntary (Informal) 
Organization: No 0.02 0.03 
Yes 0.14 
Percent Not Voting 9 
R =  0.47 
Number of Respondents (94) 
13 13 
0.49 0.57 
(60) (79) 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
almost universal expectations that the older rather than the younger, 
and the better educated not the less, will swell the ranks of the voting 
public disproportionately. But variability in turnout of persons with 
some religious identification is not predicted nor explained in the social 
structural terms common to the general explanations of vote turnout in 
the United States or the secularized nations of Western Europe. 
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SUPPORT FOR CONFESSIONAL PARTIES 
The manifest importance of confessional attachment to vote deci- 
sions is reasserted when we shift from a concern with understanding 
who votes to an interest in who among the voters support their confes- 
sional party at the polls. Moreover, where the multivariate analysis of 
turnout reduced the direct role of confessional attachment to one of 
limited direct explanatory power, comparable analyses of partisan pref- 
erences at the polls (presented in Table XV) appear to clarify and 
accentuate the place of confessional attachment as a direct factor in 
shaping voters’ choices. Within all three confessional groups, confes- 
sional attachment is a prime determinant of support for the confes- 
sional party. Neither any structural attribute nor any combination of 
them exceeds the importance of confessional attachment in holding the 
religious confessors to the party of their church. 
Beyond this most important central conclusion, the configuration of 
explanations of confessional voting contained in Table XV again chal- 
lenges us to  seek a fuller understanding of the similarities and differ- 
ences among the major religious groups of the society. Among the 
Dutch Reformed, for example, we note that early attendance at confes- 
sional school is a significant element in the explanation of their contem- 
porary behavior. The persistent role of church schooling through time is 
of interest. It is possible that relatively limited access to Dutch Re- 
formed confessional schools when the present adult population was of 
school age meant that only the most devout and deeply religious fami- 
lies were likely to secure confessional school education for their chil- 
dren. From this it might follow that confessional school attendance is 
an indicator of a more thorough religious indoctrination and a deeper 
commitment for the Dutch Reformed than for the others. However, it 
may also reflect enduring social networks and church-centered influ- 
ences that have persisted into adulthood and now sustain a religious 
commitment that is manifested both in higher participation in voting 
and in more faithful support of the confessional parties once at the 
polls. 
VOTING FOR THE LEFT 
The third and final stage of our inquiry into the political correlates 
of deconfessionalization centers on the third phenomenon noted in 
Tabel XI, the inverse correlation between strength of confessional at- 
tachment and the tendency to vote for parties of the ideological left. At 
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TABLE XV 
Multivariate Analysis of Voting Preference in 1972 Parliamentary Elections: Support for Own 
Confessional Party 
KVP CHU + ARP ARP 
Catholic Dutch Reformed Calvinist 
Sex: Male 0.02 0.03 
Female 0.10 
Age: Old 0.07* 0.03 0.19* 
Young 
Education: Low 0.12* 0.03 0.05 
High 
Subjective Social Class: Low 0.01 0.01 
High 0.03 
Occupational Status: Low 0.07 
High 0.18** 0.06 
Married: Yes 
No 0.04 0.05 0.06 
Attended Church School: Yes 0.22** 0.09 
No 0.02 
Confessional Attachment: Low 
High 0.40** 0.39** 0.15" 
Member of Trade Union or 
Professional Organization: No 0.1 
Yes 0.02 0.12 
Member of Voluntary (Informal) 
Yes 
Organization: No 0.01 0.11* 0.11 
Urbanization: Metro 0.06 
Rural 0.01 0.27** 
Percent Confessional Voting 48 
R =  0.48 
Number of Respondents (377) 
25 
0.54 
(242) 
73 
0.44 
(82) 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
each stage in the analysis we are studying successively smaller subsets of 
the original groups. The nonvoters, with a disproportionate number of 
persons only weakly attached to their confessional groups, were set 
aside for the analysis of confessional voting. Now the confessional vot- 
25 1 
ers, with a very disproportionate number of the faithful confessors, also 
have been set aside as we turn to those members of the religious groups 
who voted but not for their respective confessional parties. Despite 
these successive deletions of persons for whom confessional attachment 
TABLE XVI 
Multivariate Analysis of Voting for the Parties of the Left, 1972, Among Persons Who Did Not 
Support Their Confessional Parties 
Catholics Dutch Reformed 
- Sex: Male 0.02 
Female 0.07 
0.02 _____ Age: Old 
Young 0.05 
Education; Low 0.06 0.16** 
High 
Subjective Social Class: Low 0.35** 0.30** 
High 
Occupational Status: Low 0.03 0.03 
High 
Married: Yes 0.00 
No 0.03 
Attended Church School: Yes 0.07 0.08 
No 
Confessional Attachment: High 
Low 0.16** 0.21** 
Member of Trade Union or 
Professional Organization: No - 
Yes 0.08 0.14* 
Member of Voluntary (Informal) Organization: No 0.01 
Yes 0.08 
Urbanization: Metro 0.05 0.07 
Rural 
Percent Confessional Voting 48 25 
R =  0.44 0.54 
Number of Respondents (259) (244) 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at  0.02 or higher 
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seemed to have one or another clear political consequence, the analysis 
of “left” voting presented in Table XVI clearly indicates a distinct third 
dimension on which confessional attachment plays a significant role. 
The parties of the left draw most heavily from the most deconfessional- 
ized, and confessional attachments that were not sufficient to evoke 
support for the confessional party are nevertheless strong enough to 
restrain voting for’ the parties of the left in favor of support for the 
secular parties of the center and the right. 
At the same time the influence of confessional attachment persists, 
the importance of other nonreligious factors is most striking when the 
focus shifts to vote choices among the secular parties. Moreover, in 
sharp contrast to explanations of turnout, a decision to favor the left 
when choosing among the secular parties has about the same correlates 
for the religious as for the deconfessionalized. This conclusion follows 
from an analysis dictated by the same logic that guided our analysis of 
turnout. Table XVII follows Table XVI (in parallel with Tables XI1 and 
XIII) with the elimination of the deconfessionalized from the religious 
groups and the deletion of the two church-centered variables from the 
roster of predictors. In contrast to the analysis of turnout, the predic- 
tion of multiple correlation drops only from 0.44 to 0.41 among Catho- 
lics and from 0.54 to 0.49 among Dutch Reformed. 
The comparison of left voting among the religious in Table XVII 
with left voting among the nonreligious in Table XVIII suggests, more- 
over, that in sharp contrast to the implications of the analysis of turn- 
out (Tables XI11 and XIV), the social determinants of choice among 
secular parties are not greatly affected by one’s religious background. It 
is true that occasional intergroup differences in the correlates of left 
voting can be found. The more general impression, however, is one of 
great similarity across the various groups. 
The very high degree of success in explaining the vote of the second 
generation nonreligious suggests they may provide the norm against 
which to measure the assimilation of the deconfessionalized into the 
secular culture. At the same time, the comparability between the pat- 
tern of correlates associated with their behavior and those associated 
with professed Catholics and Dutch Reformed does not indicate that 
there are sharp cultural boundaries to be crossed. Once the option of 
voting for a confessional party is foreclosed, objective and subjective 
locations in the class structure combine in strong determination of the 
general orientation of a secular vote, whatever one’s stance toward both 
religion and the church of one’s childhood. 
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TABLE XVII 
Multivariate Analysis of Voting for Parties of the Left, 1972, Among Persons with Religious 
Preference Who Did Not Vote for their Confessional Party Using Only Non-Religious Predictors 
Catholics Dutch Reformed 
__ - ~- - 
Sex: Male 0.05 
Female 0.07 
Age: Old 
Young 0.05 0.03 
Education: Low 0.05 0.25** 
High 
Subjective Social Class: Low 
High 
0.36** 0.24** 
Occupational Status: LOW 0.03 0.07 
High 
Married: Yes 0.06 0.00 
No 
Urbanization: Metro 0.04 0.10 
Rural 
Member of Voluntary Organization: No 
Yes 0.08 
0.07 
Member of Trade Union or 
Professional Organization: 
Yes 0.02 0.13* 
Percent Voting Left 
R =  
Number of Respondents 
60 
0.41 
(21 1) 
60 
0.49 
(177) 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
Conclusion 
The place of religion in Dutch politics has been undergoing a dra- 
matic change. Public manifestations of the change have been recorded 
in a drop of almost 40% in the confessional vote since the end of World 
War 11. There are many indications that this is part of a more general 
decline in the place of the church and religious faith in people’s daily 
lives. The analysis presented in this paper has sought to  outline the 
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TABLE XVIII 
Multivariate Analysis of Voting for Parties of the Left, 1972, Among Persons Who Have No Re- 
ligious Preference 
Second Former Former 
Generation Catholics Dutch Reformed 
Sex: Male 
Female 0.27** 0.15 0.06 
Age: Old 
Young 0.08 0.19 0.03 
Education: Low 0.07 0.18 0.04 
High 
Subjective Social Class: Low 0.52** 0.39** 0.52** 
High 
Occupational Status: Low 0.04 
High 0.14 0.06 
Married: Yes 
No 0.06 0.16 0.00 
Member of Trade Union of 
Professional Organization: No 
Yes 0.37** 0.37** 0.17* 
Member of VoluntaIy (Informal) 
Organization: No 
Yes 0.05 0.22* 0.05 
Urbanization: Metro 0.12* 0.21" 0.08 
Rural 
Percent Voting Left 70 68 71 
R =  0.71 0.55 0.55 
Number of Respondents (94) (60) (70) 
* Significant between 0.03-0.10 
** Significant at 0.02 or higher 
most gross political consequences of such change, juxtaposing a recon- 
struction of religious origins or  backgrounds against current assessment 
of the strength of confessional attachments. Insofar as this juxtaposi- 
tion captures evidence of change, of individual deconfessionalization, 
the major conclusions seem clear. 
In the first place, the erosion of traditional ties to  the church of 
one's early loyalties is accompanied by withdrawal from formal partici- 
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pation in the electoral process. Interest in politics and informal partici- 
pation remain high, but the rejection of institutionalized religion is 
associated with what appears to be an active rejection of institutional- 
ized politics. As the confessional parties continue to decline in strength 
and therefore in their ability to shape the policy alternatives and politi- 
cal options open to the voter, the level of abstention among the newly 
deconfessionalized may change. They may be drawn into voting and 
formal participation at a rate more congruent with their other expres- 
sions of concern with national politics. Although more work is needed 
in this domain, preliminary indications do not necessarily support the 
thesis that the trend is destined to produce an ever increasing number 
of alienated citizens who have rejected the church of their fathers and 
now refuse to vote. 
However, for those who do remain in the active electorate, a contin- 
ued decline in confessional attachment certainly forecasts a continued 
decline in confessional party vote. A reshaping of the Dutch party 
system may forestall a reduction in the number of citizens who vote, 
but unless there is a reversal in the movement toward deconfessionaliza- 
tion, the church-centered parties will certainly continue to lose support. 
More generally, each decreasing level of confessional attachment has 
associated with it a decreased likelihood of support for the party of the 
church. If these likelihoods remain constant, the vote for the church 
parties will only reflect changes in the distribution along the attach- 
ment continuum. Even with no change in the meaning of attachment 
(such as would occur if depillarization simply made the church - or 
religion - less and less relevant for politics), the confessional vote will 
rise and fall as there are changes in the level of confessional attachment. 
Insofar as change in the future does involve general depillarization, or 
decreased political relevance of the church for all degrees of confes- 
sional attachment, the beneficiaries may be the parties of center and 
right as well as left. An across-the-board drop in level of confessional 
voting would mean many voters with strong confessional attachments 
would be turning to the secular parties and in doing so - if the recent 
past is any guide - would turn no more often to the left than to the 
other options open to them.However, insofar as the future brings a 
decline in confessional attachment without a decline in the relevance of 
confessional attachment for confessional voting, the parties of the left 
will benefit disproportionately as the newly deconfessionalized turn 
away from the parties of tradition and seek out the parties of change. 
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Notes 
1 Among a number of excellent analyses and discussions bearing on contemporary 
Dutch politics, the following will both provide a specific context for the sub- 
sequent analysis and a general context for locating Dutch politics in the larger 
ambit of Western European politics: Daalder (1966); Daalder and Rusk (1972); 
Lijphart (1968); Lijphart (1972); Lonvin (1971); Werkgroep Nationaal Verkie- 
zingsonderzoek (1973); Wolinetz (1973). 
2 The geographic distribution of confessional schools may be enough t o  limit the 
validity of this decision. It may well be that a dominant religious influence in 
childhood is not captured by our measures simply because n o  appropriate confes- 
sional school was nearby; if so, limited access t o  a religious education is now 
being interpreted as a background with minimal confessional commitment. How- 
ever, if this is so, better measurement would only sharpen the observations t o  
follow. See section on “The Social Correlates of Confessional Attachment.” 
3 Despite reference t o  the religious homogeneity of the groups, and the use of 
unitary labels for each, some groups are in fact composed of a number of differ- 
ent  sects or denominations. “Dutch Reformed” is a shorthand reference t o  
churches nominally categorized as Nederlands-Hervormd. This group embraces 
the so-called latitudinarian churches that are predominantly Calvinist in origin 
(including the Calvinistic Union or Gereformeerde Bond) but that are distin- 
guished from the more fundamentalist religions which are, in turn, grouped 
under the heading of Calvinist or Gereformeerd. Where the Dutch Reformed 
label subsumes, among others, the Modernists, Medium-Orthodox and Walloon 
Church (Vrijzinnig, Midden-Orthodox and Waalse Kerk), the Calvinist group in- 
cludes such churches as the Calvinistic (Gereformeerde Kerken), the Christian 
Calvinists (Christelijk Gereformeerd), the Old Calvinistic (Oud-Gereformeerd) 
and the Calvinistic Communities (Gereformeerde Gcmeente). 
4 Problems of assessing change are further exemplified by comparisons with other 
studies. A recent doctoral dissertation by Steven Wolinetz (1973) is most helpful 
here in presenting relevant data originally organized by Lijphart ( 1968) and 
Zeegers e t  al. (1 967). A first useful comparison is with data presented by  Woli- 
m t z  in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 of his dissertation manuscript. I f  this “Regular Atten- 
dance,” defining “practicing” Catholics, is equated with “Usually or Always” 
attend church in our 1970 analysis, the  proportion of “practicing” members 
among those with a Catholic preference has gone from 89% in 1956 t o  75% in 
1966, down t o  70% in 1970; comparable figures for  the Dutch Reformed are 
3570, 25% and 36%; and 80% t o  81% up t o  86% for  Calvinists over the same 
period. This suggests that only .the Catholic pillar is declining in strength while 
the Calvinist pillar actually has increased. But the same data source used by  
Wolinetz reports that 11% of those raised as Catholics were no longer members 
of any church in 1966, whereas our data indicate only 13% in 1970, a small 
decline indeed over the intervening four years; and the 1966 data report 7% of 
those raised as Calvinists are no longer church members while our 1970 data 
suggest 14% with no religion only four years later. To confuse matters further, 
the 1966 data show 32% of those raised as Dutch Reformed had left the church 
while our 1970 data show only 25% n o  longer identified among the faithful. In  
Table 10 of the Wolinetz manuscript, 35% of the population is described as of 
Catholic origin, 28% of Dutch Reformed origin and 14% Calvinist, against our 
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estimates of 4076, 26% and 9%. The Wolinetz definition finds 19% of the total 
population with a nonreligious background while our  definition indicates no 
more than 7 or 8%. Although each of the definitions may be well tailored to the 
goals of a particular analysis, it seems clear that they lack comparability with 
each other and provide very ambiguous assessments of recent changes in the size 
and strength of the religious pillars. 
5 Here, and later, data for Calvinists will often be omitted from tables because the 
limited sample size produces unreliable and unstable results of intragroup analy- 
sis. 
6 Appropriate bivariate relationships with urbanization hold also for the Calvinists, 
but such a large proportion of those in the Calvinist group reported attending a 
Protestant confessional school that our limited sample of Calvinists does not 
permit the three-way classification used in Table VII. 
7 At the same time we note such apparent supporting evidence for our  major 
hypothesis, we should also note two alternative interpretations. Although it 
seems likely that we have been observing the consequence of changes in confes- 
sional attachment for the six groups moving into or  out of the city, we in fact 
have n o  direct evidence that attachment has changed. Those Catholics who 
moved from Amsterdam, Rotterdam or The Hague t o  small cities and the coun- 
tryside may have taken a strong confessional attachment with them that “fit” 
their new circumstances without being influenced by  those circumstances in the 
slightest degree. Second, even if real change in attachment has occurred for those 
changing residential contexts, the causal dynamics of movement and change 
could differ from those postulated in our  major hypothesis. For  example, the 
Dutch Reformed who moved into the cities may have done so t o  escape sanc- 
tions associated with breaking rural norms and to gain the anonymity and free- 
dom of choice the city offers those who d o  not want t o  go to  church every 
Sunday. 
In  the face of plausible alternative explanations, it  still seems prudent t o  credit 
the evidence as suggesting that change in confessional attachment is associated 
with change in population size of place of residence. With so many aspects of 
Dutch society, from birth to death, organized around the church-related pillars it 
is hard t o  imagine that the network of social contacts, once reestablished, would 
not have a profound influence on personal attitudes toward the churches them- 
selves. In The Netherlands, as much or more than anywhere in the industrialized 
west, we might expect the full gamut of social contacts in the office or  factory, 
in the neighborhood, on the playing fields and in the clubs and social organiza- 
tions t o  have a relevance for  confessional attachment. And for persons who have 
left the familiar circumstances of the place where they grew up  for new homes 
elsewhere, either the freedom or the lack of opportunity t o  set one’s level of 
confessional attachment without regard for the familiar distinctions of age, sex, 
class or occupation provides new social definitions of the necessary or approp- 
riate. 
8 Problems of extreme multi-colinearity among crucial variables limit the utility of 
a comparable analysis of Calvinists. 
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